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Article
Growing up beside you:
A relational sociology
of early childhood
Norman Gabriel
Plymouth University, UK
Abstract
This article will begin by outlining influential attempts by historians and sociologists to
develop a more adequate theoretical understanding of past and contemporary child-
hoods, focusing on the major problems that stem from the pivotal role that ‘devel-
opmentalism’ plays in their arguments. I will argue that sociologists can overcome some
of their deepest fears about the role of developmental psychology by developing a
relational approach that integrates the biological and social aspects of children’s devel-
opment. In the development of a relational sociology of early childhood we need to make
important connections with closely related disciplines, but at the same time draw on and
integrate research findings from relevant areas within the social and natural sciences. An
alternative perspective drawn from the writings of Norbert Elias will be put forward and
illustrated by discussing some of the key concepts that Elias and Vygotsky used to explain
the language development of young children.
Keywords
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Introduction
Since the translation of Philippe Arie`s’s (1962) groundbreaking Centuries of Childhood,
historians of childhood have emphasized the importance of placing children in the centre
stage of their analysis, exploring how childhood as a central concept has shaped the way
that children are perceived as different from adults (Hendrick, 2003; Cunningham,
2006). This historical context provides an important foundation to understand the major
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contributions that, during the last 40 years, have contributed to the debate about
the importance of including children within a sociological perspective. I will first exam-
ine the work of Arie`s which had a profound influence on the emerging new paradigm, the
social construction of childhood. It was the first study to historicize childhood, to suggest
that childhood was not a ‘natural’ or ‘universal’ phenomenon, but one that varied accord-
ing to period and place. In taking their inspiration from Arie`s, historians gathered
together a range of material on past constructions of childhood, interpreting it as either
a short period or a long one, or as a stage of life that was either despised or venerated by
adults. Based on Heywood (2010), three key arguments from Centuries of Childhood
will be discussed and assessed in the light of recent historical research.
The first key argument stems from the oft-quoted line that ‘in medieval society the
idea of childhood did not exist’ (Arie`s, 1962: 125). Before the 15th century, there was
little collective awareness of children as different – from the age of 7 they were con-
sidered as smaller adults. Arie`s based his argument on an extensive analysis of paint-
ings and iconography, where there were very few representations of the uniqueness of
children, ‘They have simply been depicted on a smaller scale’ (ibid.: 31). He also drew
from other sources, notably clothing, games and attitudes to sexuality. He argued that
children after the age of 3 or 4 played the same games as everyone else, either among
themselves or with adults. Children were to be found gambling at cards and playing
tennis and hockey, while adults cheerfully joined in snowball fights or games of
blind-man’s-buff. Arie`s also pointed to the evidence of sexual games courtiers played
with the future French king Louis XIII, fondling his genitals and making jokes about
his future wife when he was still an infant. For him, this was the most compelling evi-
dence available for the absence of the modern idea of childhood at the beginning of the
17th century.
The second key argument is that in the late 16th and 17th centuries there was the ‘dis-
covery of childhood’, spread over a long period of at least 4 centuries. It started with the
‘coddling’ of children during the 14th and 15th centuries, taking a delight in their com-
pany, moving on to its discovery by a small group of reformers, composed of priests,
lawyers and ‘moralists’, who grasped the innocence and weakness of young children.
Notions of children’s special nature and needs called for particular attention to their emo-
tional development in the home and for formal education in the school aimed at prepar-
ing children for the transition to an adult world. One important consequence was that the
very short childhood of the past, ending around the age of 7, gave way to the modern
form of childhood – in a British context, Hendrick (1997) has analysed these successive
constructions and reconstructions of childhood by emphasizing a number of dominant
forms of discourse that include the ‘romantic’, ‘evangelical’, ‘factory’, ‘delinquent’,
‘schooled’, ‘psycho-medical’, ‘welfare’, ‘psychological’ and ‘family’ child.
Arie`s’s last and third key part of his argument is that with this modern conception of
childhood there emerged a new conception of the family: the return of children to their
families was a ‘great event’ of the 17th century, one that transformed parent–child rela-
tions. He discussed a long and complicated shift from the medieval family concerned
with problems such as the honour of the line, to the modern family, focused exclusively
on the relationship between parents and children. In the medieval period children left
their families at an early age, weakening their emotional bond with their parents, but with
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middle-class parents becoming more concerned with education they remained at home
longer and so were able to develop intimate relationships.
Arie`s’s thesis was critically scrutinized by other historians in relation to its histor-
ical method, its interpretation and the evidence that lay behind his claims, particularly
his contention that a historical change in parent–child relations occurred (see the influ-
ential study by Pollock, 1983). Early in his book he uses the terms of ‘indifference’ and
‘callousness’ in his discussion of attitudes towards children, which he linked directly to
the high infant and child mortality of the medieval and early-modern periods. His
explanation was that parents could not allow themselves to become attached to chil-
dren they were most likely to lose. In marked contrast by the 17th century the family
had become secure in the privacy of its home and the care given to children made it
possible for a new emotional attitude to emerge. However, it is important to note that
Arie`s stated that the absence of a concept of childhood in medieval society was still
compatible with affection for children – it did not mean that children were ‘neglected,
forsaken or despised’ (1962: 125).
But does the absence of children in paintings necessarily reflect a lack of care or con-
cern for their welfare? Orme (2001) has shown that from the 13th to the 15th centuries,
there was a growing interest in drawing and painting the young, reflected in examples of
children incorporated into scenes of everyday life, as they fell into wells or fires, suffered
beatings from parents and schoolteachers, played with their friends, studied in class – or
were led away by the Grim Reaper. Shahar (1990) has in a similar way questioned
whether a general indifference to children among parents during the medieval period
gave way to a warmer emotional relationship in the modern, child-centred family. She
has argued that Arie`s was incorrect to suggest that medieval society had no concept
of childhood as young children could not survive without strong arrangements of child-
care from one generation to the next.
Nevertheless, some historians such as Shorter (1977) and Stone (1979) were keen on
the idea of a dramatic change in parent–child relations during the early-modern period
and had no doubt that the modern approach was an improvement on the traditional one.
Influenced by Arie`s, both emphasized a warmer, more affectionate family environment
as economic interest was replaced by the importance of emotion. E. P. Thompson, the
well-known Marxist historian, offered a devastating critique of their approach:
It annoys me that both Professor Stone and Professor Shorter leave their readers to feel so
complacent about their own modernity. It annoys me even more that both should indict the
poor, on so little evidence, of indifference to their children and of callous complicity in their
high rate of mortality . . .But if the lower orders had not formed some kind of affective
bonding and familial loyalty, we, their descendants, might never have made our gracious
descent. (1977: 501)
Arie`s has also been criticized for his ‘present-centeredness’ (Wilson, 1980), that is,
viewing the past exclusively from the point of view of the present. He looked for evi-
dence for our 20th-century conception of childhood in medieval Europe and when he
failed to find it, jumped to the conclusion that it did not exist. At this point in my argu-
ment, it is useful to make the distinction between a concept and a conception. Archard
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(1993) has argued that in all societies there has been the concept of childhood, a struc-
tural distinction between children and adults that suggests some sort of universal differ-
ence. However, a conception of childhood means that the way in which this universal
difference manifests itself is dependent on the structure of a particular society. Therefore
within different societies, there will be contrasting ideas on the key issues of how long
childhood lasts, the qualities marking out adults from children and the importance
attached to their differences.
The following quotation by the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886)
aptly emphasizes the difficulties in conducting historical research and demonstrates how
issues can be selected and evaluated solely from the standpoint of what is regarded as
important by historians in contemporary societies. These contemporary circumstances
can determine how and what we see as history:
History is always being rewritten . . .Each period takes it over and stamps it with its domi-
nant slant of thought. Praise and blame are apportioned accordingly. All this drags on until
the matter becomes unrecognisable. Then nothing can help except a return to the original
evidence. But would we study it without the impulse of the present? . . . Is a completely true
history possible? (Ranke, 1925: 52 in Elias, 2006: 6)
Towards a new paradigm – social constructions of childhood
The sociologists Alan Prout and Allison James noted that history was one of the first dis-
ciplines to take up new directions in the study of childhood during the 1970s. They
emphasized the work of Arie`s for the way his interpretation of childhood during the
medieval period provided an important example of its variability in human societies.
‘Arie`s’ challenge to orthodoxy’, they wrote, lay in his suggestion that the concept of
childhood emerged in Europe between the 15th and 18th centuries, ‘thus blasting a large
hole in traditional assumptions about the universality of childhood’ (Prout and James,
1997: 16). They were aware of the contentious nature of Arie`s’s work, but insisted that
‘the particular form of modern childhood is historically specific’ (ibid.: 17).
During the 1960s and 1970s, childhood was seen as a universal process of socializa-
tion: it was identified as a range of practices by which the child internalizes the norms
and values of the social system, and is transformed from an asocial being into an adult
member of society. The aim of socialization theory was to explain the transmission of
culture from one generation to another by the key institutions of community, education
and the family (see Elkin and Handel, 1972). In the structural-functionalist writings of
the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the work of Parsons (1951), socialization became
defined as a psychological process whereby the child learns the ‘laid-down’ patterns
of values that will mould him or her into existing society. Learning to conform to social
rules, children gradually acquire knowledge of the roles needed for adult life.
Within child-rearing psychology, what was important was finding ways of turning the
immature, irrational and incompetent child into a mature, rational and competent adult.
These dominant principles at the heart of developmental psychology have been referred
to by Smart, Neale and Wade (2001) as the embryonic model, one where children are
considered to be in a state of permanent transition, either within or between stages.
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Discourses about ages and stages became linked to developmental norms, encoded in
milestones and developmental delay. Within this framework, childhood is viewed as
an apprenticeship for adulthood that can be charted through stages related to age, phys-
ical development and cognitive ability: groups of children were organized according to
their birth dates, institutionalized in age-graded classrooms with their progress tracked
according to predefined key stages (Woodhead, 2008).
The emergence of a new paradigm for a social construction of childhood can therefore
be viewed as a response to these dominant intellectual trends in ‘developmentalism’, ‘the
set of ideas about child and childhood systematized and promulgated by child psychol-
ogy’ (Stainton Rogers and Stainton Rogers, 1992: 37) and structural-functionalist the-
ories of socialization (James and Prout, 1997 and James, Jenks and Prout, 1998). As
Wyness suggests,
. . . what sociologists of childhood argue is that children’s biological differences from
adults need to be separated from the cultural components of childhood. The idea that chil-
dren are commonly believed to be morally and culturally weaker or less significant than
adults does not necessarily indicate that this incapacity or subordination is based on their
physiological or biological weakness. Children in different historical and cultural contexts
are quite capable of actions that belie their physiological immaturity. (Wyness, 2006: 23)
Researchers working in the new social studies of childhood that emerged in the 1970s
and early 1980s began to rethink childhood and challenge this view that children were
passive recipients of socialization (Richards, 1974). Sociologists of childhood (see in
particular James and Prout, 1997; Mayall, 2002) emphasized the present tense of child-
hood, children’s active participation in constructing their own lives and their relation-
ships with parents and friends. They argued that in the early years of human life a
different framework is needed to understand the institution of childhood: ‘children are
not formed by natural and social forces but rather they inhabit a world of meaning cre-
ated by themselves and through their interaction with adults’ (James, Jenks and Prout,
1998: 28).
A key aspect in James and Prout’s (1997) framework is their commitment to devel-
oping a more sensitive awareness of different versions of childhood and children’s
experiences as they construct their own lives. They have criticized the belief that there
exists one universal childhood, a ‘standard’ childhood that is based on the experiences of
children in developed countries. Childhood is a social construction because of the spe-
cific ways in which very young children become socialized in different societies. To
overcome the problems of assuming that children are the same throughout the world,
it is important to take into consideration the different cultural contexts of children grow-
ing up in developing countries. James and Prout (ibid.) have pointed out that it is biolo-
gical immaturity rather than childhood that is a universal feature of human groups. This
model of developmental ascent from biological immaturity to adulthood is based on a
proposed universality – a fundamental belief in a ‘psychic unity’ that all humans are sub-
ject to general laws (Jahoda, 1992). Defining children in terms of their physical growth
and psychological development from infancy to adulthood ‘the child’ can represent all
children and be studied in the laboratory.
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Burman (1994) has similarly argued that developmental psychologists present an
impoverished view of what it means to be social. The social is primarily represented
by the mother–child relationship, which is further equated with communication and then
finally seen as ‘interpersonal’. Developmental psychologists like Bowlby lapse into a
form of biological reductionism by dissolving the social into the biological, ignoring
other significant relationships that involve infants and young children. Burman believes
that, in the attempt to overcome the division between the ‘social’ and the ‘cultural’, an
evolutionary perspective once again is reintroduced, one that fragments ‘cultural varia-
tion into individual differences’ (Burman, 1994: 43).
According to Woodhead (2008), James, Jenks and Prout (1998) went furthest in their
critique of traditional developmental psychology, focusing on the assumptions of one
of the most influential developmental researchers in 20th-century Europe, Jean Piaget
(Piaget, 1970). As immature learners, young children are viewed as a set of ‘potentials’,
a ‘project in the making’, researched within an evaluative frame that is mainly interested
in their position on the stage-like journey to mature, rational, responsible, autonomous,
adult competence. Significantly Woodhead (2008) steers a balanced course and argues
that although the rigidity of these developmental stages was rightly challenged, this
should be viewed within the context of early 20th-century public attitudes towards young
children. Developmental approaches did not diminish the status of young children’s
thinking, but were used to reform social practices. He believes that researching biologi-
cal, social and cultural processes of human learning and development is consistent with
an agenda for childhood studies.
The new wave of childhood studies
Sociologists of childhood have tried to resolve some of the important theoretical tensions
that emerged with the establishment of the new paradigm by drawing on different phi-
losophers and sociologists. This section will focus on how these tensions are largely
based on dichotomies between nature and culture, ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, and the con-
cept of a universal childhood versus a multiplicity of childhoods. I will review how some
sociologists have made important attempts at theoretical unification, which, although
pointing in the right direction, still contain certain significant problems.
Prout (2005) and Lee (2001), influenced by the European philosophers Deleuze and
Guattari (1987), argued that the previous established paradigm in the sociology of child-
hood is situated in a binary logic that examines childhood through the lens of either cul-
ture or nature, thus failing to overcome what Lee and Motzkau (2011) have described as
the problem of ‘bio-social dualism’. The defining characteristic of the new wave is its
attempt to finally break the grip of bio-social dualism in order to clear the way for new
ways of sociological thinking about childhood. Prout (2005, 2011) has argued that the
narrowness of such dichotomies, including the placing of psychology against sociology,
is symptomatic of the modernist agenda in childhood studies. Lee (2001) similarly
focuses on the being–becoming dichotomy which is structured by a division between
childhood as an unfinished state of ‘becoming’ and adulthood as an order of ‘being’.
Using children’s play, Lee questions this being–becoming duality and argues against the
psychological conception of maturation as a passage from ‘disorder to order’, suggesting
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that ‘if children appear disorderly this is not because their activities lack order. Rather it
is because their activities contain a profusion of different orders which they can move
between very rapidly’ (2001: 141).
Prout (2005: 62), one of the leading theorists of this new wave in the sociology of
childhood, rejects social constructionism for focusing on human action and meaning,
while the rest of sociology has been ‘searching for metaphors of mobility, fluidity and
complexity’ rather than permanent social structures. Instead, society can be seen as ‘pro-
duced in and through patterned networks of heterogeneous materials; it is made up
through a wide variety of shifting associations (and disassociations) between human and
non-human entities’ (ibid.: 109). Relationships should be considered equally between
children and physical materials, spaces and hybrids that do not sharply distinguish
between social constructions and nature. Although assemblages bring together and cre-
ate stability from these heterogeneous elements, each assemblage can change and
become something different. In this way, social order becomes an imaginative, creative
and open-ended process.
Qvortrup (2005) challenged this increasingly dominant focus within childhood
studies on the complexity of childhoods, at the expense of focusing on structural power
relations within childhood. His argument was that by focusing on the multiplicity of
childhoods, the power of the concept of childhood, which lies in its ability to draw atten-
tion to the way in which children are marginalized and made invisible in social and eco-
nomic policy, was being undermined and weakened. He argued that the plurality of
childhoods was obscuring the overriding structural importance of childhood in terms
of generation and intergenerational relations:
. . . the promoters of the plurality thesis typically belong to the social constructionist mood
or the postmodernist strands of social research with strong reservations against so-called
grand narratives and generalisations and thus against what they see as unitary or even deter-
ministic explanations. They have a strong sense for perceiving the society as complex and
therefore for avoiding simple – or in their view simplistic – explanations, which at the end of
the day typically leads to a preference for uniqueness. Each childhood, therefore, is a unique
childhood with its particular points of reference which cannot fully be shared by others’
childhoods. (Qvortrup, 2005)
The ‘generational perspective’ (Alanen, 2001) added another important dimension to
explaining children and childhood. On the one hand, this approach suggests ‘childhood
is a permanent social structure, even if its members are continually being replaced’
(Qvortrup, 1991: 12). On the other hand, it acknowledges ‘generationing processes’
(Mayall, 2002) that are both structured and structuring (Bourdieu, 1984, 1990), where
the concept of generation can be compared with other structures such as gender and
class. Mayall (2002) argues that there are two aspects of the concept of generation which
can be very helpful in studying childhood. The first aspect considers the different pro-
cesses by which childhood is constructed and modified: in relationships between chil-
dren and adults, in group transactions between teachers and pupils, and in relations
between people born at different periods in history. The second aspect examines the
extent to which children inhabit a generation, viewing themselves differently from older
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social groups. The ways in which children think of themselves can be seen as occupying
a common generational location, one structured by adults’ beliefs and behaviour.
This generational location can be used to turn our attention to the relational processes
between adulthood and childhood, how adults use their positions of power to define dif-
ferences between adults and children. At all levels of analysis (e.g. individual, group, or
cohort) in this generational approach, sociologists should focus on how children and
adults negotiate decisions through space and time (Mayall, 2002). It is the structural
commonalities that define childhood as a separate generational space, where children are
set aside from adults. For example, at school, although rules are enforced and cultural
assumptions deeply embedded, there is often some scope for modification by children
through discussion and resistance.
Alanen (2009) introduced the concept of generational order to emphasize the power
dimensions through which children and adults position themselves: children construct
a social position that is situated within other structural processes such as parenthood
(Alanen, 2001). An analysis of childhood must be built around the structures and insti-
tutions of the particular society in which children live: as a social space, any childhood is
situated within a system of social stratification and is part of a set of generational rela-
tions with older age groups – ‘all children have parents in one form or another and are
socialized in one way or another – the details will vary but the process is common’
(James, 2010: 493).
I will now summarize some of the strengths and weaknesses of the different contri-
butions that sociologists and historians have made to the sociology of childhood, sug-
gesting some ways of bringing these different areas together to develop a sociology of
early childhood. There is no doubt that Philippe Arie`s’s influential book (1962) inspired
a wide range of historical studies that explored the emergence of various versions of
childhood in earlier periods. But his claims for the uniqueness of childhood as a histor-
ical, western European construction generated heated debates and critiques (see, for
example, de Mause, 1991).
In historical analysis, it is sometimes all too easy to be influenced by the partiality of
one’s own feelings and the values of today’s society. Mu¨ller (2009) argues that a modern
version of an innocent childhood perpetuated a myth about the discovery of childhood
in the latter decades of the 18th century: children need special attention, care and protec-
tion through the family, schools and legal regulations and therefore childhood is
cherished as a natural form of existence with which most adults have lost touch.
Discovering a Romantic version of childhood that emphasizes innocence, contempo-
rary historians of childhood have been far too influenced by the ideals of their time.
Frijhoff (2012) argues that the historical entanglement of childhood and the self needs
to be kept at a distance because the discovery of childhood can readily evolve into a per-
sonal discovery of ourselves – the values of the historical child can easily be transferred
to the modern historian and vice versa. He believes that the real problem for the historian
of childhood is to remain faithful to the categories of the past as well as the present,
but without fully identifying with the child that has been. This is a difficult balancing
act, because our own emotions are involved – the great Dutch cultural historian Johan
Huizinga (1872–1945) introduced the useful concept of ‘historical sensation’ to draw
attention to the importance of direct contact through the feeling of personal involvement
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in a past event, a person’s history, or a historical remnant. Despite this rather more
nuanced discussion of the influence of emotional values on historians of childhood,
Frijhoff (ibid.: 28) states that ‘any personal story is, of course, singular and not really
repeatable’. Once again the uniqueness of historical events is reintroduced and empha-
sized, without determining how historians of childhood can explain the relationship
between the repeatable and non-repeatable aspects of social change. No problem seems
more difficult for historians to conceptualize and explain than the direction and structure
of long-term change.
In a similar way to these polarized discussions about whether the history of child-
hood has ruptures or continuities, sociologists working within the new paradigm of
childhood studies have struggled to overcome a strong dichotomy between a universal
version or multiple versions of childhood. The result has been a historical trajectory
that ‘zig-zags between the poles of the opposition, now placing childhood at the bio-
logical end, now the social’ (Prout, 2005: 43–4). Forged along the tracks of a nature
and culture dichotomy, childhood has become the object of distinct fields of scientific
study that do not communicate. According to Thorne (2007), a ‘wall of silence’ stands
in the way of dialogue between developmental psychology and the new social sciences
of childhood.
Age and development
I now want to focus on age and why it remains one of the most contentious categories
that haunt previous and recent attempts to develop a new sociology of childhood, mainly
due to its close associations with the developmental model of childhood. A good exam-
ple is the article by James (2010), a bold attempt to overcome competing theoretical per-
spectives based on the dichotomy between one universal category of childhood and
multiple childhoods. In the development of his argument, other dichotomies, like the
adult–child one, keep emerging and encouraging him to take a closer look at age differ-
ences between children and young people. Although he mentions that the English lan-
guage contains important relational terms to distinguish between different aspects of
childhood – a newborn, an infant, a babe-in-arms, a toddler, a child – he remains stead-
fast in his rejection of ‘a hegemonic developmental perspective’ (James, 2010: 490).
Morrow (2013: 154) similarly remarks that although being an infant or a young per-
son is important, underlying assumptions about age ‘run the risk of solidifying develop-
mental thinking’, limiting the relational child to a specific chronological age group.
However, Uprichard (2008) offers an alternative perspective by arguing that childhood
is a stage of the human life-course that chronologically precedes adulthood, part of a bio-
logical and irreversible ageing process: ‘being’ a child and ‘becoming’ an adult is neces-
sarily bound by the ‘arrow of time’ (Coveney and Highfield, 1990). She attempts to
uncover some of the temporal dimensions that lie behind the ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ dis-
courses in different constructions of childhood: children are not only aware that older
people were once younger, or that they themselves will change as they become older,
but also have different views and experiences about what it means to age in a changing
world. The children in her interviews negotiated and imagined their future lives – they
were constructing themselves as ‘being and becomings’. Mona, a 5-year-old living in
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York, exclaimed, ‘I can’t wait ’til I’m seven because then I can go to the shops by
myself!’ In contrast, Sophie, a 4-year-old child, was not so excited about becoming older
because she assumed that being an adult may also involve being ‘boring’.
Age is such a contentious issue because it draws attention to some of the unresolved
tensions in the relationship between natural or biological processes and the social.
McNamee and Seymour (2012) analysed 320 empirical research articles published
between 1993 and 2010 in three of the leading journals in childhood studies, Children
and Society, Childhood and Children’s Geographies, concluding that there was an
over-emphasis on a particular age group. Their analysis of the different articles sug-
gested that 10-, 11- and 12-year-olds are at least three times more likely to be included
than a 5-year-old and nearly twice as much as a 17-year-old. The younger age groups
(5–7) were less likely to be included in the articles than those at the upper end of the
childhood continuum, the 15–18-year-olds. This analysis raises once again a central
question for this article – why do we need to distinguish between early childhood and
late childhood? Although recognizing that some of the studies on much younger children
or teenaged groups may appear in journals concerned with early childhood education or
youth studies, McNamee and Seymour (2012) argue that there is still a lacuna in key
‘childhood’ journals, making it important to question some of the foundational concepts
in the social construction of childhood.
Elias suggested a very important way out of this impasse by arguing that we need to
define clearly the difference and relationship between biological evolution, social devel-
opment and history. These three concepts form distinct but inseparable layers in a pro-
cess encompassing the whole of humanity but each level runs at different speeds. In
biological evolution, 10,000 years is a very short period. The changes that have taken
place in the biological constitution of our species are relatively slight. Although there
were some evolutionary changes in the social relationships of our ancestors, whether
they were the ancient Egyptians or the English, we are always concerned with human
beings, people like ourselves: ‘Whatever the ancestors of humanity may have been, as
far as we can see back into the past we see an unbroken chain of parents and children,
who in turn become parents’ (Elias, 2010: 24).
However, in social development 10,000 years is a considerable period of time because
the changes in social organization that have taken place are relatively enormous. What
makes history possible is that the structure of our social life takes place without changes
in our biological constitution – historical change is possible because the experiences
gathered from one generation need to be transmitted to the next. But in terms of the time
it takes for young children to grow into old men and women, long-term social develop-
ments take place so slowly that they seem to stand still. This gives the impression that
developments in the relationship between adults and young children are static, rather
than structured changes in social expectations and behaviour. A fully developed rela-
tional perspective needs to investigate the inter-generational structures of young children
and adults. A key aspect of this inter-generational process is memory. The moon, for
example, is a constantly changing form – Elias asks how our ancestors could achieve
an integrating concept that would synthesize its different shapes in the sky? His answer
is that ‘It could only have resulted from a long process of learning, of the growth of peo-
ple’s stock of experiences, some of which recurred again and again and, over the
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generations, were remembered as recurring’ (Elias, 2007a: 55). Young children interna-
lize an enormous social fund of knowledge about the world that is passed on from one
generation to the next.
In the next section, I will present the main theoretical argument for a sociology of
early childhood, one that develops a flexible and dynamic approach that can understand
and explain the early years as a distinctive period of human development, integrating
research findings on young children from a range of different, but related, disciplines like
biology, psychology and history. Drawing on Norbert Elias’s work, I will argue that it is
crucial for sociologists to explore different levels of biological and social processes in
the development of young children.
The relational turn in psychology
For Elias (2009), it was crucial for sociologists to determine the relation between nature,
culture and society and the unique characteristics that distinguish human beings from
other animal species. He made an important conceptual distinction between the term
‘evolution’, which refers to biological processes that are genetic and largely irreversible,
and social ‘development’, processes which are malleable and potentially subject to
change. In the evolutionary process, the biological propensity for learning is one of the
main differences between animal and human societies, providing a framework for social
development to take place. To identify the universal features of social life that make
society possible, the adaptation of a distinctive biological organization of human beings
for learning needs to be understood. In terms of social-evolutionary development, the
distinguishing, evolutionary breakthrough for human beings was that learned ways of
steering behaviour became dominant in relation to unlearned forms. For young chil-
dren, there are ‘natural human structures which remain dispositions and cannot fully
function unless they are stimulated by a person’s ‘‘love and learning’’ relationship with
other persons’ (Elias, 2009: 147).
Elias argues here that this ‘love and learning’ relationship emphasizes that specific
experiences must happen at ‘the right time’, mentioning in particular when children are
ready to learn a language. This relational integration of love and learning draws attention
to the way in which children’s development is both a cognitive and an affective process,
one in which biological and social processes are intimately woven together. It is also sig-
nificantly an important critique of an ‘academic’ approach to psychology which sepa-
rates areas into institutional divisions that treat individual psychology as a natural
science and social psychology as a social science:
Yet, although the psychological levels of a human person – whether conduct or feeling, con-
science or drive – are invariably patterned by learning and thus have natural and social char-
acteristics at the same time, quite a number of individual psychologists proceed in their
research as if the persons they study were natural objects pure and simple, unaffected by
their social language or any other social patterning. (Elias, 2007a: 116–17)
One of the important consequences of this emphasis on adopting the methods of natural
science is that psychologists fall into the trap of methodological dualism, a separation
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between behaviour and mind. In so doing, they resurrect for themselves the traditional
dualistic ‘problem’ of other minds. These psychological accounts of how people make
sense of other people have usually shared a common format:
1. Each is a detached observer, rather than actively engaged with the other in some
joint project.
2. The information available to each of us about other people is limited and disor-
ganized, and hence, there is a gulf between what we can actually observe about
them, and what they themselves feel, intend, or believe.
3. Each of us, therefore, has to engage in some or other intellectual ‘detour’ to
bridge the gap between what can be immediately experienced about the other per-
son and that person’s psychological states. (See Asch, 1952: 144–50)
However, within modern psychology there is a growing trend to criticize what has
been termed the spectator theory of knowledge, in which participants are required merely
to observe others or think about their mental states rather than participate in social inter-
action with them (see Reddy, 2008). Schilbach et al. (2013) have argued that a second-
person approach overcomes the ‘spectatorial gap’ by focusing on emotional engagement
as an active process executed by an organism situated in the environment, where people
are not isolated from but embedded in the perceived world. Fogel et al. (2006) have simi-
larly referred to this emphasis on relationships as relational-historical research which is
based on three premises: first, that the developing relationship, not the individual, is the
unit of analysis; second, that change emerges from but is not entirely constrained by pat-
terns of the past; third, that the developmental process is best revealed by making obser-
vations within a particular case before, during and after a key developmental transition.
The work of Colwyn Trevarthen (2005) and Vasedevi Reddy (2011) is a good starting
point for developing this relational approach to human development because they both
synthesize a great deal of recent neurological, biological and psychological research to
highlight the unique biological equipment of human beings that prepares young babies
and children to enjoy and share companionship with others. In a similar way to Elias,
Trevarthen emphasizes how the ‘human body and brain’ are adapted for communication:
momentary shifts of gaze and ‘gazing reverie’ are made possible by the distinctive white
sclera of human eyes and the versatility of human vocalization and sustained phonation
achieved by the ‘uniquely adapted human respiratory system’ (Trevarthen, 2005: 60–1).
Similarly, Elias (2012a: 105) argues that what makes human societies possible is ‘the
adaptation of human biological organization for learning’. In his work, he emphasizes
the important role that language plays in human development, which will be discussed
in more detail in the next section.
Quest for synthesis
So far, I have emphasized how the different strands of early learning and social devel-
opment need to be integrated into a suitable theoretical framework, one that can be used
to explain the distinctive, biological characteristics of human beings. The rest of this arti-
cle will now focus on one important, universal feature in society, the early development
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of language by young children, investigating the relationship between Elias and the
Russian developmental psychologist, Lev Vygotsky.
What can two very different biographical and intellectual careers have in common?
Elias was a sociologist who productively worked and lived in various European countries
until the age of 93; Vygotsky, a Russian developmental psychologist who was influenced
by the Marxist ideas of the Soviet Revolution, dying at the young age of 37 from tuber-
culosis. First, what is significant is that both were not only attempting a broad intellectual
synthesis from within their own subject areas, but also trying to integrate disciplines that
were usually considered separate and unrelated: biology, social anthropology, history
and psychoanalysis, to name just a few. They argued that previous approaches in psy-
chology or sociology had reduced social relationships to the investigation of isolated
concepts, with little consideration of how factors relate to one another. For example,
in studies of language development, academic specialists have separated connected pro-
cesses into independent areas of study; as a result of the application of this form of anal-
ysis to verbal thinking, meaning had been divorced from sound. To reflect complex
psychological processes as activities, what was required was a significant reorientation
of thought, one that would restore the dynamic and interrelated aspects of socio-
psychological systems, capturing ‘the movement from thought to word and from word
to thought’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 250). In a very similar way, Elias (2011) emphasized that
traditional academic specialists like philosophers have constructed theories of knowl-
edge and language into separate human activities, three different worlds known as lan-
guage, reason and knowledge. To replace the reduction of processes to static entities,
Elias argued that these three different realms should be viewed as symbols whose func-
tion is to connect relationships between thinking, speaking and knowing.
Second, another key similarity between Elias and Vygotsky was their integration of a
highly sophisticated developmental perspective. Their developmental approach not only
attempted to understand the group moulding of individual childhood in existing societ-
ies, but also wished to explain this moulding within a wider framework that included the
different stages of human development in history. Both emphasized that development is
not linear, a straight path of quantitative accumulations, but a dynamic and uneven pro-
cess that can give rise to new structures or qualitative changes at higher levels of orga-
nization. In the 1920s Vygotsky and his colleagues, Alexander Luria and Alexei
Leontiev, proposed a human science of psychology to stand alongside the natural
sciences. The central thesis of the Russian cultural-historical school was that the struc-
ture and development of human psychological processes emerge through culturally
mediated, historically developing, practical activity. Crucial to this approach was the
integration of individual, social and cultural historical levels within the analytic unit
of activity:
The growth of the normal child into civilization usually involves a fusion with the processes
of organic maturation. Both planes of development – the natural and the cultural – coincide
and mingle with one another. The two lines of change interpenetrate one another and form
what is essentially a single line of socio-biological formation of the child’s personality. To
the extent that development occurs in the cultural medium, it becomes transformed into a
historically conditioned biological process. (Vygotsky, 1930: 47)
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Significantly, Vygotsky argued that these higher processes such as language cannot be
reduced to inferior ones: according to Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991), Vygotsky’s
consistently anti-reductionist perspective can be seen as a major contribution to psychol-
ogy. He argued that human psychological functions are organized hierarchically, each
level needing to be studied in its specifics. As human beings develop, the natural stage
is not replaced by later cultural stages, but superimposed like scaffolding on top of the
former, changing, restructuring and adapting these natural processes. The biological
newborn grows up in an environment composed of cultural artefacts – as a result, two
‘lines’ of development, the natural and the cultural, merge into a unique form of human
development.
When Elias (2009) discussed ‘higher psychological functions’ such as learning, he
used concepts that were very similar in imagery to Vygotsky’s. For example, he consid-
ered learning as the ‘reciprocal processes of the biological and the social’ and the ‘inti-
mate interweaving of learned and unlearned processes’. Like Vygotsky, Elias argued that
evolutionary biology needed to be interwoven into a long-term conception of human
development. In his fragments on the ‘Great Evolution’ (2007b: 179–233), he outlined
in a non-reductive way the different stages of integration from atoms to the most highly
integrated of organisms – human beings. In trying to explain this developmental process,
he emphasized that higher levels of integration must be explained in terms of their stage-
specific behavioural and functional properties, which are not reducible to their lower
component parts. To explain more complex formations, one needed to know not only the
structural properties of lower-level units, but also how they are organized functionally.
I shall now discuss some of the concepts that were introduced by Elias and Vygotsky
to understand the development of young children as they move from communicating
sounds to learning and eventually mastering a language. For Elias (2011) an important
conceptual distinction needs to be made between the term ‘evolution’, which should
refer to biological processes that are genetic and relatively fixed, and ‘development’,
social processes that are more malleable and subject to change. In his attempt to identify
some of the distinguishing characteristics of human beings that ‘animal psychologists’
like Lorenz have ignored, Elias mentions a unique human capacity ‘for controlling and
modifying drives and affects in a great variety of ways as part of a learning process’
(Elias, 2007a: 125). This capacity for developing forms of self-restraint is central to
Elias’s argument in On the Process of Civilisation (2012b): the increasing social con-
straint towards self-constraint is related to more demanding social standards of self-
control. Social pressures lead to more self-control, with the behaviour of individual
people being regulated ‘in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable
manner’ (ibid.: 406).
An integral aspect of civilizing processes is that young children should eventually
grow up through their own self-regulation: the long-term movement from ‘external con-
trol’ to ‘self-control’ can be directly compared with Vygotsky’s explanation of the cen-
tral role of internalization processes in the acquisition of language. In order for children
to regulate their own speech behaviour and understand the same symbols, speech is inter-
nalized, organizing, and integrating, disparate aspects of children’s behaviour, such as
problem-solving and memory. According to Vygotsky (1987), inner speech is what
makes thinking possible. It is a distinctive speech function, a form of verbal thinking that
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mediates between word and thought. Two important processes are interwoven in inner
speech: the transition from external communication to inner dialogue and the translation
of intimate thoughts into a linguistic and communicative form. This concept of inner
speech is a type of speech that is ‘mute’ and ‘silent’, involving no vocalization.
Once again, what is highly significant is Elias’s (2011) similar use of imagery to
discuss internalization in The Symbol Theory. In language communication, one of the
functions of the term ‘thinking’ is to refer to the capacity of human beings to put
through their paces symbols anticipating a sequence of possible future actions without
their performance in reality. At this level, thought is not easily recognizable as a flow
of voicelessly produced sound-symbols, an abbreviated version of the audible use of
language that can be converted into spoken language. These forms of abbreviated
thinking are associated with the manipulation of stored memory images: according
to Elias, these do not have to be set out step by step, but can be telescoped, recalled
and used when the occasion demands.
Conclusion
This article has argued that sociologists need to develop a relational sociology of early
childhood that focuses on the long-term historical relationship between young children
and adults. Alanen (2009) has called for sociologists to develop a consistent sociology of
childhood, one that incorporates the theoretical insights of the ‘relational turn in sociol-
ogy’ (see Crossley, 2011) and attempts to overcome common dualities such as the indi-
vidual versus society, structure versus agency, micro versus macro. Such dualities are
based on a substantialist approach that conceives the social world as consisting ‘primar-
ily in substances or in processes, in static ‘‘things’’ or in ‘‘dynamic, unfolding relations’’’
(Emirbayer, 1997: 281). A range of sociological theory is embedded in rational-actor and
norm-based models, functionalism, structuralism, statistical ‘variable’ analyses – the-
ories in which the entities are seen as prior to relations. Emirbayer (ibid.) argues that the
alternative is a relational perspective that depicts ‘the social’ as dynamic, continuous and
processual.
A relational sociology of early childhood offers a dynamic analysis of the structural
relations of young children’s lives, focusing on how children see themselves in relation
to their older counterparts, usually teachers and parents, though this should also
include the importance of relationships within generations, particularly peer friend-
ships and siblings. To survive, young children need to learn from their elders and this
is why the concepts of generation and inter-generational relationships are so important
for understanding the relation between past and present childhoods – what we observe
is an unbroken chain of parents and young children who in turn become parents. Young
children are born into interdependent relationships that existed before them: as they
grow up these relationships change but are structured in different societies and in dif-
ferent historical epochs.
Can sociologists identify a long-term trend in the relationships between young chil-
dren and their parents in different societies? Gabriel (2010) has explored how the con-
cept of ‘nature’ has been used to inform and shape different historical beliefs about
the best way to bring up young children, focusing on one very important area: the ‘moral’
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upbringing of children and changing patterns of parental advice which have evolved
since the 18th century. He has argued that the child as ‘natural’, ‘pure’ and ‘innocent’
functioned as a basis for the late 18th- and early 19th-century Romantic vision of child-
hood. The early Romantics drew attention to the ideal of childhood as an area of interior
self with a personal history. They believed that to grow up into adulthood and ‘civilized’
society was a journey away from the source that was the most valuable aspect of our-
selves, the child as vital, full of energy and passionate.
This ‘inner childhood’ became a very important touchstone for later scientific and
moralistic developments in child-rearing practices, because it retained the division
between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ child. If children were ‘naturally’ good, then parents
would have to develop skills to meet their needs and educate them. But if they were
‘naturally’ bad or sinful, then according to the Evangelicals children risked being
damned for ever. Their beliefs dominated both the advisory literature available to parents
and children’s own reading for nearly two centuries (Newson and Newson, 1974).
In contemporary society, there are similar concerns that influence parents’ attitudes
and behaviour towards child-rearing. Sociologists like Furedi (2008) have argued that
there is now a ‘plague’ of paranoid parenting which can be explained by wider cultural
forces such as the loss of parental authority and uncertainties about moral values. How-
ever, his analysis tends to be rather focused on short-term changes that need to be both
distinguished from and connected to transformations on a larger scale and to underlying
developments in the long run. Elias (2008) refers to one such development as an infor-
malizing process, a period of movement from an authoritarian to a more egalitarian par-
ent–child relationship where there is a loosening of barriers of authority in relations
between children and adults. He argued that during the late 20th century, the parent–child
relationship had lost some of its hierarchical character, with young children being given
more autonomy and a greater degree of decision-making. Significantly, this leads to a
high degree of self-restraint from adults in their relations with young children: parents
appeal more to affection and reflection, teaching their children to control themselves,
rather than simply obey the external constraints of adults (Wouters, 2007).
I have also argued that we need a flexible approach that can explain the early years as
a distinctive period of human development, integrating research findings on young chil-
dren from a range of different, but related, disciplines like biology, psychology and his-
tory. Norbert Elias’s work overcomes traditional academic divisions by identifying the
hinge that connects social and biological processes in the long-term development of
humanity. From this viewpoint, all young children need to experience ‘love and learn-
ing’ relationships: in every society young children are distinguished from adults in order
to ensure the survival of and care for biologically immature human beings, though the
particular form of childhood is historically specific.
This was then illustrated by discussing some of the innovative concepts that Elias and
Vygotsky used to explain a universal process of humankind, the early development of
language. Both provide a sophisticated, developmental perspective that can follow the
interweaving of biological and social processes as young children learn from their elders
a specific language to survive and grow in their societies. These processes are discussed
in highly nuanced relational concepts that are deliberately sensitive and more suitable for
integrating the affective and cognitive aspects of social learning and comparing the many
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different types of language that humanity has developed. Such processes are crucial for
understanding the ways in which young children grow up to become members in their
different communities.
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